Residence Laws - A Step Forward or Backward? by Anthony F. LoGatto
The Catholic Lawyer 
Volume 7 
Number 2 Volume 7, Spring 1961, Number 2 Article 5 
June 2016 
Residence Laws - A Step Forward or Backward? 
Anthony F. LoGatto 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl 
 Part of the Catholic Studies Commons, and the Immigration Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Anthony F. LoGatto (1961) "Residence Laws - A Step Forward or Backward?," The Catholic Lawyer: Vol. 7 : 
No. 2 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl/vol7/iss2/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
RESIDENCE LAWS -A STEP
FORWARD OR BACKWARD?
ANTHONY F. LOGATTO*
T HE RECENT PASSAGE of Senator Mahoney's bill, which was signed by
Governor Rockefeller on April 12, 1961, making residence within
the state a condition for eligibility to receive public assistance broke prece-
dent with long tradition. Actually there has never been in New York
State a requirement that persons receiving assistance' be residents of the
state for any particular period of time prior to receiving assistance. 2 As
far back as 1873, New York State law provided that persons without
settlement in the state were "State charges."'3 Settlement was defined as
living in a town or city for one year without receiving public assistance
or care.4 This departure from tradition, however, was not accomplished
without strong opposition and resolved itself ultimately into a com-
promise measure which took much of the vigor out of it.5
*M.S.S.S., LL.B. Priest of the Diocese of Brooklyn; Associate Director, Catholic
Charities; Lecturer in Sociology, St. John's University; Member of the New York
Bar.
I The statute will be known as the N. Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW §139-a.
2 N. Y. State Ass'n of Councils and Chests, "Residence" as a Requirement for
Public Assistance, Memorandum No.-1 (Dec. 1956).
3 Ibid. Since 1946, the N. Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW §2(21) (Supp. 1960) has pro-
vided that "state charge shall mean ... any needy person without state residence."
4 N. Y. Sess. LAWS 1939, ch. 802, §56. In 1946, this section was repealed and a
new definition of residence was adopted. See text accompanying note 9 infra.
5 See note 1 supra. The residence requirement adopted by this bill is not absolute;
rather it centers around applicant's intent in entering the state. If the public welfare
official determines that the applicant entered the staie for the purpose of receiving
public assistance or care, the application may be disapproved. The bill sets out
those factors which must be considered in making such a determination, as follows:
"a. That the applicant is gainfully employed at the time of the application, or
But why the clash, and the sharp debate
over a simple residence provision? Forty-
seven states of the union have residence re-
quirements of one length or another6 - why
not New York? The answer obviously lies
in the opposing ideologies. The one side,
favoring the law, sees economic advantages
b. That the applicant has been gainfully em-
ployed since his arrival in the state for a
period of at least one month during his first
year of residence in the state, or
c. That the applicant had reasonable assurance
of gainful employment before his arrival in
the state, or
d. That the applicant had reliable assurance
of adequate private aid, maintenance or
support or resources from relatives, friends
or other sources in this state for himself and
for any person dependent upon him for
maintenance or support who preceded, fol-
lowed or accompanied the applicant to this
state, or
e. That the applicant for the first six months
after his entry into the state made no ap-
plication for public assistance or care, or
f. That in the case of an applicant who has
entered the state within six months of the
date of his application, such applicant en-
tered the state for some purpose other than
to receive public assistance or care.
The burden of proof is on the applicant who
applies for assistance within six months after his
arrival to show that his purpose in entering the
state was not in order to receive public assistance
or care. A failure to sustain this burden of proof
gives rise to a presumption that the applicant en-
tered the state for the purpose of receiving assist-
ance and he will be deemed "undeserving of and
ineligible for assistance."
This bill also makes provision for temporary
emergency relief to an applicant in immediate
need.
6,See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 49, §17(14) (1958);
ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. §51-2-51 (1949);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §46-209 (1956); ARK.
STAT. §83-124 (1947); CAL. WELFARE AND
INST'NS CODE §§2001, 3041, 4160; COLO. REV.
STAT. §119-6-6 (Supp. 1957); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§17-85, 17-109 (1960); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 31, §504 (1953); GA. CODE ANN.
§§99-603, 99-704 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§§56-207-09 (1947); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23,
§406 (Smith-Hurd 1958).
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to the state and, to some extent, social ben-
efits. The other side, opposing the law, sees
basic democratic, moral and humanitarian
principles at stake with some concern for
economic losses to the local community.
Since the floor of the legislature does not
lend itself to an academic leisure which per-
mits a more speculative analysis of the
issues, this paper shall attempt to make a
valuative judgment on the merits of the
question from which, hopefully, to move
into the question of dollars and cents. To
put it more simply, is there a right and a
wrong per se in a residence requirement, or
is it just dollars and cents?
New York Law
Prior to the recent amendment, New York
State had no residence requirement. Section
62 of the New York Social Welfare Law
provided that "subject to reimbursement in
the cases hereinafter provided for, each pub-
lic welfare district shall be responsible for
the assistance and care of any person who
resides or is found in its territory and who is
in need of public assistance and care which
he is unable to provide for himself. ' 7 "Re-
imbursement" as used in this section refers
to a distribution of costs between the local
community and the state. The term "state
charge" refers to the assuming of the cost
of assistance and care by the state for any
needy person without state residence.
"Local charge" refers to the assuming of
costs by the local community for any other
needy person with state residence." A person
with state residence is "any person who shall
reside in the state continuously for one year.
... I' Hence, the cost of assistance and care
7 N. Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW §62(1) (Supp. 1960)
(emphasis added).
8 N. Y. SoC. WELFARE LAW §§2(21) (22), 62(3)
(Supp. 1960).
9 N. Y. SOC. WELFARE LAW §117 (Supp. 1960).
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for an indigent person without state resi-
dence is attributable to the state on a one-
hundred per cent basis; but as to a person
who has established state residence, the
cost is attributable to the local community,
in this case New York City. 10
Thus far, the factual picture. Of more
basic concern, however, are the philosoph-
ical, legal and social issues involved. Some
questions immediately suggest themselves:
what is the position of the public assistance
recipient? Does the state bear any respon-
sibility toward the destitute within the con-
fines of its borders? May a state refuse ad-
mission to an indigent person? May a state
prohibit or hamper the free movement of
persons between states? Underlying all of
these questions, however, is the ultimate
question: are human values and moral issues
involved? If so, what inferences are to be
drawn as to state policy and public policy?
An examination of these questions follows.
Philosophical Issues
It is the province of philosophy to demon-
strate and define the basic values which
govern the relationships of man to man, of
man to the state (and, of course, of man to
God). Therefore in attempting to evaluate
social policy, such as is being done here in
reference to public assistance, recourse must
10 Welfare programs under the Social Security
Act are shared as to costs by the city, the state and
federal governments in accordance with reim-
bursement formulae, set forth in that law. The
funds for aid to dependent children are con-
tributed by federal payments of about fifty per-
cent and by state and municipal payments of
about twenty-five percent each. Other programs
are supported by the state and municipality ex-
clusively, as in the case of home relief, or solely
by the municipality, for example-day care of
children. FEDERAL AND STATE AID TO MUNICIPAL
WELFARE AND HEALTH PROGRAMS IN NEW YORK
CITY 28 (1955).
first be had to principles (which are derived
from values). These in turn determine the
validity of legal enactment and of the dis-
persal of funds, private or public.
To return to the issues, what is the posi-
tion of the public assistance recipient? Is it
one of right or of charity? If it is of right,
what kind of right is it, moral or legal?
"[C] harity leads us to help our neighbour in
his need out of our own stores, while justice
teaches us to give to another what belongs
to him."" Justice is the rendering to each
one what is already his; he has right, title
or interest already vested; and so we may
speak of justice only when there exists this
independent title.12 Charity, on the other
hand, exerts its demand because of the com-
mon bond of human nature. Man is for-
bidden by natural law to exclude his fellow
man and to close his eyes to his needs and
frailties.' 3 The rights of the needy, therefore,
are in charity and not in justice - both as
against the individual and as against society.
In pursuance of positive (enacted) law,
however, the right of the needy is not only
in charity but in justice too. The law creates
the liability.14 This natural law doctrine is
not only the doctrine of the Church but,
interestingly enough, it seems to be shared
rather exactly by the courts in their various
pronouncements. In Bila v. Young, the
court said "the moral obligation resting
upon the state to care for its indigent aged
was raised to the dignity of a legal obligation
by the adoption of the legislation ... "15
(Welfare and Institutions Code providing
that any aged person qualifying under the
11 8 CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 571-72 (1913).
12 1, NOLDIN- SCHMITT, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE
MORALIs 271 (1940).
13 2" NOLDIN - SCHMITT, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE
MORALIS 81 (1940). '
14 See notes 12-13 supra.
15 20 Cal. 2d 865,-, 120 P.2d 904, 908 (1942).
provisions thereof shall be entitled to old
age relief). It was stated in Creighton v.
Pope County'0 that there is no legal obliga-
tion on the part of the state or any local gov-
ernmental unit to support poor persons or
blind persons unless such obligation is
created by statute. Practically all other cases
speak in'a similar vein.1 7
Legal Issues
This is the philosophical basis. What is
the basis, however, in statutory law? Since
the common law developed, in an atmos-
phere of close Church-State relationships,
the works of charity, so characteristic of the
Church, were assumed by the Church, thus
relieving the secular government of this
duty.' 8 "At early common law there was no
legal obligation on any of the instrumental-
ities of state to furnish relief to paupers.
Matters of charity were thought more ap-
propriate for the church."1 9 This arrange-
ment came to an end as of the time of the
English Reformation and the consequent
confiscation of lands and estates from the
Catholic clergy, especially from the monas-
tic orders. 20 Once this private and organized
16 386 Ill. 468, 54 N.E.2d 543 (1944).
17 Duren v. City of Binghamton, 258 App. Div.
694, 18 N.Y.S.2d 518 (3d Dep't 1940); State v.
City of Bristol, 139 Conn. 469, 95 A.2d 78 (1953);
Newland v. Child, 73 Idaho 530, 254 P.2d 1066
(1953); Michel v. State Bd., 245 Iowa 961, 65
N.W.2d 89 (1954); Bureau of Old-Age Assistance
v. Commissioner, 326 Mass. 121, 93 N.E.2d 267
(1950); Weber v. Weber, 77 N.D. 142, 42 N.W.2d
67 (1950); State ex rel. Ranz V. City of Youngs-
town, 140 Ohio St. 477, 45 N.E.2d 767 (1942);
North Dakota ex rel. Strutz v. Perkins County,
69 S.D. 270, 9 N.W.2d 500 (1943).
18 MURRY - FLYNN, SOCIAL PROBLEMS 364-67
(1938); O'GRADY, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND
THE DESTITUTE 21-24 (1929); STROUP, SOCIAL
WORK 41 (1948).
19 Thiede v. Scandia Valley, 217 Minn. 218,-, 14
N.W.2d 400, 408 (1944).
20 MURRY - FLYNN, op. cit. supra note 18, at 367-
72.
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system of charity was done away with, the
vast number of destitute flocking into Lon-
don and other English cities compelled the
public conscience to do something about it.
The English Poor Laws of 160121 initiated
a system of public, tax-supported relief and
the establishing of the alms house and the
work house. Penal and lacking in dignity as
it was, this enactment (and a few less im-
portant ones that preceded it) was the fore-
runner of succeeding enactments and ulti-
mately of the vast system of public assistance
which is so commonplace today in com-
mon-law countries. 22 Today public relief is
either by statute, constituting a legal right,
or it doesn't exist at all, at least as enforce-
able in law.2 3
The authority of the state to provide for,
and regulate the care of the needy and the
distressed is found in the police power of
the state. 24 This is generally defined as the
right and duty of the state to watch over and
promote the health, safety and welfare of
its citizens. 25 "Relief by the state of the
21 English Poor Laws, 1601, 43 Eliz. c. 2.
22 See note 19 supra.
2 3 See notes 15-17 supra.
24 Moore v. Walker County, 236 Ala. 688, 185
So. 175 (1938); People ex rel. Heydenreich v.
Lyons, 374 Ill. 557, 30 N.E.2d 46 (1940); Prof-
fitt v. Christian County, 370 Ill. 530, 19 N.E.2d
345 (1939); Bowman v. Frost, 289 Ky. 826, 158
S.W.2d 945 (1942).
25 See Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907).
The police power extends to "dealing with the
conditions which exist in the State so as to bring
out of them the greatest welfare of the people."
Id. at 318. See also Northwestern Laundry v.
City of Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (1916) (limit
smoke nuisance); Laurel Hill Cemetery v. City
of San Francisco, 216 U.S. 358 (1910) (control
burial of the dead); California Reduction Co. v.
Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306 (1905)
(regulate removal of garbage and other waste
or noxious matter); Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11 (1905) (compel vaccination); Dent
v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889) (regulate
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needy and afflicted who are unable to care
for themselves is an accepted exercise of
valid authority under the police power in
promotion of the general welfare. ... -26 At
early common law, however, this authority
assumed a more personal tone. The King,
as ultimate owner of all the lands of his king-
dom, exercised toward his people, as his
vassals, a paternalistic attitude and control,
also assuming thereby an ultimate respon-
sibility toward them for their general wel-
fare. 27 "It is the unquestioned right and
imperative duty of every enlightened govern-
ment, in its character of parens patriae, to
protect and provide for the comfort and
well-being of such of its citizens as, by rea-
son of . . . misfortune or infirmity, are un-
able to care for themselves. -2 8 It is in this
role of "parens patriae" that the courts in
the name of the state exercise a particular
vigilance over the orphan, the neglected and
dependent or the delinquent child.
The remaining, questions, in many ways
very important ones, such as whether or
not a state may refuse admission to indigent
persons or prohibit and hamper the free
movement of persons between states will
be treated in the latter portion of this paper.
All Those In Favor
The foregoing considerations frame the
issues. The arguments on the part of the pro-
ponents and the opponents of residency fol-
low and in that order. It is interesting to note
that the position of those favoring a resi-
dence limitation is more easily formulated
the practice of medicine); Powell v. Pennsyl-
vania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888) (regulate sale of
adulterated foods and drugs or protect the milk
supply).
26 Bowman v. Frost, supra note 24, at 948.
27 See MOYNIHAN, REAL PROPERTY 1-4 (1940).
28 Creighton v. Pope County, 320 Ill. App. 256,
-, 50 N.E.2d 984, 986 (1943).
and simpler to assimilate, while that of the
opponents to the law limiting residence is
more extensive to formulate, more subtle
to grasp and more philosophical and socio-
logical in evaluation.
There is no doubt, broad as this assertion
seems, that the primary motive of the pro-
ponents of residence laws is to cut welfare
costs for the state and in some instances
where the law so provides, as in New York
State, to pass these costs on to the local
community if it chooses to accept the in-
digent into its borders.
2 9
High on the list of the proscribed is the
indigent migrant who drifts into the state,
according to the proponents of the law, to
enjoy the relief grants, obtainable practically
without difficulty or delay. Senator John H.
Cooke, lusty champion for residence laws
in New York State, proclaimed that the re-
cent amendment "will close our borders to
the chiseling free-loader." 30
Also of a budgetary nature is the objec-
tion that an unlimited influx of unskilled
labor is prejudicial to native labor since the
higher paid New York worker is not able
successfully to compete with "cheap" labor.
Senator Walter J. Mahoney, Republican
majority leader, arch-advocate of residence
laws for New York State, has called the bill
"an economic necessity" because of the in-
creased competition for jobs.3 1
A more critical charge is the argument
that the immigrant group fosters crime and
delinquency and swells the jails and treat-
ment centers of the state. So, too, they are
charged with being the active agents in de-
pressing real estate values, creating slums,
and fostering vice. In fact, there is very little
that is wrong in New York State that has not
9
29 See N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 19.58, p. 18, col. 3.
.10 N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1960, p. 32, col. 2.
31 N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1961-, p. 16, col. 3.
45 -
been attributed in some way or other to
minorities migrating into the state.
All Those Against
The position of those against a residence
limitation ranges from a very simple state-
ment that such is not a limitation, to very
solemn pronouncements of a philosophical
and sociological nature.
The charge that the indigent flock into
New York State, or into any state without
residence requirements, attracted by the fat
bait of easy-to-get relief benefits, is one which
strikes with immediate impact. The instinct
not to be made a fool brings instant re-
sponse to the charge which now has amazing
plausibility. The convert, with characteristic
zeal, repeats the charge, now with convic-
tion and indignation. This is prejudice - a
judgment before the facts, really on allega-
tions gratuitously assumed. Logically, this
argument is quickly disposed of, since what
is gratuitously asserted is gratuitously
denied. This clears the head but not the
feelings, which somehow still persist. The
fact is that those best in a position to know,
whose very profession is to deal with people
in difficulty, with the indigent, the newcomer,
the disadvantaged, bear strong testimony to
the fact that people are decent, and want
respect; they don't want "charity." Private
social agencies, public welfare agencies, the
National Association of Social Workers and
the three major faiths3 2 are on record as
opposing residence restrictions. This is a
formidable array of people who know. Are
others in a comparable position to pass
judgment? The history of the world and
experience with human nature point up the
fact that people are born into this world with
strong instinctual drives to survive and to
32 See N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1958, p. 20, col. 4.
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improve their lot. Society puts high value on
this upward surge and social pressure whips
the spark of self-initiative into a flame. The
few who unfortunately lack or who have
lost this upward mobility are sick members
of society who need help and treatment
rather than castigation. They have already
suffered much.
The facts happily support the more
benign attitude toward new peoples. It is
most enlightening to observe, for instance,
that residence laws have not acted as a
deterrent to the flow of populations from
state to state when opportunities for jobs
and homes were present. California33 which
has about the most stringent residence laws
in the country was second only to Florida in
attracting new residents.34 This in spite of
the fact that Florida itself has a tough resi-
dence law.35 A recent Chicago study sup-
33 CAL. WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE §4160
(Supp. 1960). Aid shall be granted to the dis-
abled "who resides in the State and has so re-
sided continuously for at least one year imme-
diately preceding the date of application and for
at least five years within the nine years imme-
diately preceding the date of application." The
severity of California's welfare laws is most
evident in its prohibition of aid to those who
became blind while a non-resident of California
unless they have been residents for a period of
ten years. CAL. WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS
CODE §3041 (Supp. 1960). [Author's note: This
eligibility requirement of residence for a period
of ten years appears to be inconsistent with the
express provisions of the Social Security Act
which provide that a state may in its own
discretion establish a residence requirement not
to exceed five years in the case of aid to the
disabled, old-age assistance, and aid to the blind,
and one year in the case of aid to dependent
children. Unfortunately many states have adopted
the permissive maxima as the state standard. See
NATIONAL TRAVELERS AID ASS'N, RESIDENCE
LAWS: ROAD BLOCK TO HUMAN WELFARE, 6
(1956).]
34 N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1961, p. 17, col. 3.
35 Florida has adopted the maximum limitation
established by the Social Security Act. To estab-
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ported the same inference. 3 The New York
State Department of Social Welfare re-
ported that in 1955 non-residents made up
only 1.8% of the case load.3 7 According to
testimony presented last year, only 1.5%
had not lived in the state for a period of one
year.38
As for duration of dependency, and this
is an important consideration since an an-
nual increase of even 1.5 % per year could
reach a staggering proportion in time, it was
found in New York City that the average
duration of assistance to non-residents was
six months for state charges and ten months
as to local charges or a total of sixteen
months. 39 It must be borne in mind here
that this average included such cases as aid
to dependent children, aid to the blind, and
old age assistance which generally are long
term cases. In upper New York State, a
study revealed an average length of care of
fourteen months. To round out the picture,
the same study shows about 18% of the
1.8% of needy non-residents require help
over a long period of time. 40
lish eligibility for old-age assistance or aid to the
blind, the applicant must show that he has been
a resident of the state during at least five years
of the nine years immediately preceding applica-
tion and a resident of the state one year imme-
diately preceding application. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§409.16-17 (1960). Aid to dependent children
will be granted only if the child has resided
within the state one year before making applica-
tion or, if the child is less than one year of age,
if the child's parents or guardian has lived
within the state one year before the birth of the
child. FLA. STAT. ANN. §409.18 (1960).
36 N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1961, p. 17, col. 3.
37 N.Y. State Ass'n of Councils and Chests,
"Residence" as a Requirement for Public Assist-
ance, Memorandum No. 1 (Dec. 1956).
38 N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1961, p. 21, col. 5.
39 See note 37, supra.
40 Ibid.
The Right To Free Movement
Thus far, we have considered the rights
of the needy to assistance and care and the
corresponding duty of public authority to
provide accordingly. The subject of resi-
dence laws, however, would be essentially
incomplete were no thought to be given to
the wider and more ultimate question of the
right of every human being to free move-
ment in fulfillment of his destiny and in com-
pliance with the natural law mandate that
he seek the perfection of himself as a per-
son.
In fulfillment of this legitimate aspiration
man may not arbitrarily be cut off from the
resources of the earth, since these are his
only resources as a natural being. As was so
well enunciated by Pope Pius XII "the
Creator of the universe made all good things
primarily for the use of all." '4 1 Again, in the
same document, His Holiness emphasized
that the right to free movement "is based
upon the very nature of the earth upon
which men live."'42 In Sacred Scripture the
phrase of classic beauty is "The earth is the
Lord's and the bounty thereof. '43 More con-
cretely, the Holy Father declares freedom
of movement as the fundamental right of
families and of peoples to live in reasonable
dignity and decency. Again he refers to it
as the freedom of man to move from place
to place and of the family to seek light and
air for proper expansion. 44
It must b& added at once, however, that
the right of the individual, of a family, or of
a people, to free movement has reasonable
41 The Right to Migrate, THE CATHOLIC MIND
478 (Sept.-Oct. 1960).
42 Ibid.
43 ZIMMERMAN, PIUS XII AND INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION 1 (1959).
44 Id. at 2.
limitations arising from the rights of others.
Thus no individual, group or even a nation
must accommodate others to the point of
self-detriment since the right of the one in
possession is at least as-great as that of the
other in need. The one is not to be saved by
the destruction of the other. "States have a
right to limit the influx of immigrants when
this is done for real and genuine reasons of
the common good, but they cannot exag-
gerate this right to the detriment of other
peoples without transgressing the moral law.
. Arbitrary laws are unethical .... -45
The doctrine of free movement both of
the Church and of natural law, has its reflec-
tion in the statutory law of the United States
and in Supreme Court decisions reflecting
constitutional provisions. Curiously enough,
the Constitution of the United States makes
no express reference to the right of free
movement among the various states. But, of
course, there is interpretation of pertinent
constitutional clauses in the various opinions
of the Court. In the early cases it is interest-
ing to observe the reflection of the punitive
attitudes of the Elizabethan laws carried
over to the new world as part of the English
heritage and the change to the more benev-
olent and humanitarian attitudes of later
years. In the very outspoken case of Mayor
of the City of New York v. Miln,46 a very
early case, the Supreme Court said: "We
think it as competent and as n6-cessary for a
state to provide precautionary measures
against the moral pestilence of paupers,
vagabonds, and possibly convicts; as it is to
guard against the physical pestilence, which
may arise from unsound and infectious
articles imported, or from a ship, the crew
of which may be laboring under an in-
4;, Id. at 3-4.
4121 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
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fectious disease. '47 Fortunately this case
was overruled in later decisions. One famous
case, making specific reference to the out-
moded holding of the Miln decision, said
"the theory of the Elizabethan poor laws no
longer fits the facts .... *"48 "[W] e do not
think it will now be seriously contended that
because a person is without employment and
without funds he constitutes a 'moral pes-
tilence.' Poverty and immorality are not
synonomous." 49 A line of cases,50 culminat-
ing in Edwards v. California,51 just quoted,
expressly grant the individual within the
borders free movement from state to state.
The Passenger Cases as early as 1848 con-
tained this lofty language: "For all the great
purposes for which the Federal government
was formed, we are one people, with one
common country. We are all citizens of the
United States; and, as members of the same
community, must have the right to pass and
repass through every part of it without inter-
ruption, as freely as in our own States.
52
Crandall v. Nevada speaks of the same right
holding that it "is in its nature independent
of the will of any state over whose soil he
must pass in the exercise of it.' 53 The death
knell to the last vestige of the Elizabethan
spirit was sounded in Edwards v. California,
passing directly on the issue: "We are of the
opinion," stated Mr. Justice Byrnes, "that
§ 2615 is not a valid exercise of the police
47 ad. t 142-43.
48 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 174
(1941).
491d. at 177.
,0Twining v.,New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908):
Henderson v. Mayor of the City of New York,
92 U.S. 259 (1875); Crandall v. Nevada, 73
U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867); Passenger Cases, 48
U.S. (7 How.) 282 (1849); Mayor of the City
of New York v. Miln, 21 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102
(1837).
;,' See note 48 supra.
52 Passenger Cases, supra note 50, at 492.
53 Crandall v. Nevada, supra note 50, at 44.
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power of California; that it imposes an un-
constitutional burden upon interstate com-
merce. . . .,4 Mr. Justice Douglas, con-
curring, preferred not to base the decision
on the commerce clause. Rather, he was of
the opinion that the right of persons to move
freely from state to state was an incident of
national citizenship. 55 The tenor of this line
of cases was always one of national concern
and geared toward a philosophy of provid-
ing a haven for the distressed and the home-
less.
In many of the cases . . . in which the
Supreme Court ruled against state restric-
tions on interstate and foreign commerce,
the state was encumbering or prohibiting
mass population movements, either the
countless thousands streaming from Europe
and Asia in the last century or the westward
migration of Texies, Arkies and Okies from
drought, dust and depression in the 1930's.5 6
With the promulgation of the fourteenth
amendment in 1868, an effort was made to
protect the right of free movement under
its privileges and immunities clause, but
after a few feeble attempts the effort was
abandoned.
Under the comity clause of the Constitu-
tion - "The Citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all the Privileges and Immunities
of Citizens in the Several States" - a new
effort was made to protect the right of free
movement. This approach, however, never
found grace with the courts. 5 s
One very competent student of the prob-
lem of free movement and its constitutional
protection feels very strongly that an in-
dispensable element of the right of free
4 Edwards v. California, supra note 48, at 177.
55 d. at 177-81.
56 TENBROEK, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RIGHT
OF FREE MOVEMENT 9 (1955).
5 7 Id. at 11.
581d. at 12.
movement is the right to be on an equal
footing with established residents of the
community. 59 "If you may be denied sub-
stantial rights after arrival, if you may be
barred from the common callings and re-
sources of the community available to
others, if opportunities of life and livelihood
may be withheld from you on a discrimi-
natory basis, then the right to go there is
emptied of all substance and meaning." 60 It
is the opinion of the same writer that
"length-of-residence requirements, existing
universally throughout the country and in
profusion, operate as an impairment of the
right of free movement. They should accord-
ingly be held unconstitutional. They are not
generally necessary as local police regula-
tions." 61
Free Movement An Economic Necessity
Underneath the heavy layer of philosoph-
ical and legal arguments supporting the right
to free movement there is a very practical
aspect which must not be forgotten - and
that is that mobility is the essence of the
economy of the United States as a nation.
"The foundations of our nation were laid by
people who have traveled far. Americans
have been 'on the move' ever since."'62 Even
with the passing of the frontier days the de-
cennial census from 1890 on demonstrates
that native Americans move from their state
of birth in progressively increasing percent-
ages. The only exception was during the de-
pression years of the thirties. 63 The inference




61 ld. at 15.
62 NATIONAL TRAVELERS AID Ass'N, RESIDENCE
LAws: ROAD BLOCK TO HUMAN WELFARE 8
(1956).
63 Ibid.
The succeeding war years and the years
following the war brought a boom in popula-
tion movement from state to state. Since
1950 about five million Americans have
moved from one state to another every
year. From 1950 to 1954 the populations of
Arizona, California, Florida and Nevada in-
creased from eighteen to thirty-one per-
cent. 4 This constant interflow is the medium
whereby knowledge, goods and skills are
changed and interchanged. It is this mobility
of manpower and brains which feeds the
labor market and makes America the
greatest industrial nation of the world and
enables it to enjoy the highest standard of
living on this globe. As Robert C. Goodwin,
of the United States Department of Labor,
states, "Free people are not moved - they
move. They move because they are free to
seek opportunity where they see it."' 1 The
pertinence of Mr. Goodwin's observation is
that a free people stand in need of and will
respond to intelligent guidance, in order to
lessen the social problems which result from
the mass movement of population. And this
is very probably the solution to a substantial
portion of the problems surrounding con-
gested cities. Certainly were the government
and voluntary groups to concentrate their
energies and resources on intelligent and
well-disseminated information, supply
would more closely approximate demand.
The Bureau of Employment Security and
the various state employment services aim
at placing the right man in the right job and
at the right time.66 This is of particular im-
portance to migrant labor, which suffers
high casualties in terms of seasonal work,
lack of insurance protection, and of dis-
64 Ibid.
65 Id. at 9.
66 Ibid.
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crimination in such vital services as health
and welfare.
The lack of intelligent planning, insuffi-
cient services, and unwise concentration in
certain cities and areas of the country has
given rise to critical attitudes toward that
element of the moving population which
falls by the wayside. Thus the recruitment
of workers from Puerto Rico in the late
years of the war and in the early post-war
years to meet the high demands of a bustling
economy in some northern states led in part
to the higher relief roles for Puerto Ricans.
It must be kept in mind that the wages of
Puerto Ricans and Negroes is generally one-
third less than that of the white working
force. These people are ill-equipped because
of low earning power and because of dis-
criminatory labor practices to protect them-
selves against such hazards as unemploy-
ment, sickness, and accident; hazards against
which the white worker is much more ade-
quately protected. In spite of these short-
comings Puerto Rican and Negro labor
still fill the needs of the garment and hotel
industry and make up much of the domestic
help of such cities as New York which have
high concentrations of these groups.
Faith in human nature, the bond of
charity and plain common sense urge that
efforts be continued in the direction of in-
telligent and benevolent assistance to new
groups. Certainly much has been done to
alleviate and ameliorate the plight of the
"uprooted." But much remains to be done.
The slum housing, depressed neighbor-
hoods, unsanitary and indecent living con-
ditions, high delinquency and crime areas,
are not the result of the new arrivals. Rather
they are conditions that preceded and con-
tinue with them. Puerto Ricans, for ex-
ample, now form a definite part of teen-age
gangs in New York City and yet this is not
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a tradition of the streets of San Juan but of
the streets of New York.6 7 Judge Leibowitz,
of Kings County Court in New York City,
testified that migrants come to New York
"looking for a better life" but they are
forced into "rat-infested places where they
can't have a chance in the world." 8 Even if
migration would cease, it would not solve
the city's problems. All of them existed in
New York long before their arrival - slum
housing, juvenile delinquency, narcotics,
low wages, racial tensions.6 9
Conclusion
The presence of a new population is at
once a threat and a challenge. If met with
distrust, prejudice and pessimism, it could
develop into retaliatory tactics - repression
67 N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1959, p. 39, col. 4.
68 N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1959, p. 19, col. 1.
69 See note 67 supra; Plight of the "Uprooted,"
AMERICA 121 (Oct. 31, 1959).
on the one side; violence, hatred and deg-
radation on the other. But as a challenge
it can stimulate a constructive philosophy
which lifts a people up to a standard rather
than depresses them. Residence laws, in
view of the new learning, of new attitudes
of rehabilitation, tend, as they were meant
to be in their inception, to be suppressive
rather than supportive. Residence laws are
an escape from an irritating problem and
constitute a throwback to approaches now
considered unhealthy, unrealistic, and un-
fortunately ineffective since they leave the
underlying problem largely untouched.
In a modern technological age where the
ingenuity of man can send a man into outer
space and retrieve him, certainly it can put
man on intelligent, elevating work, which re-
spects his dignity, enhances his surroundings
and lets him live, as he was meant to live,
as master of the universe, not as its slave.
SOCIETY'S CHALLENGE
(Continued)
an awareness of it, this is much more of a
problem for them. The Catholic Church
has built up a huge educational system in
this country, and over the years we have
learned to accept the financial burden which
it entails. While we would like to be re-
lieved of the double burden on our pocket-
books and our sense of social justice, and
while the burden becomes increasingly
heavier with the expanding concept of
what constitutes a school, we can continue
to bear it. But with minor exceptions, our
non-Catholic neighbors are dependent upon
public schools. Their children are being
victimized by the exclusion from the public
schools of any mention of God or of the
purpose of creation. How are their chil-
dren to develop the ethical principles and
the moral consciousness which our society
so desperately needs? The question is not
easy of solution, but I am confident that
one can be found if the majority of the
people in this country are made to realize
that one must be found. Here, then, is a
chance to supply the intellectual leader-
ship in the public interest which is the
historical prerogative and the inherent duty
of the legal profession. We who see the
importance that belief in God and knowl-
edge of His divine plan bear to our demo-
cratic institutions have an obligation to
teach it, for, as St. Thomas More believed,
"we cannot desire what we do not know nor
can man achieve what he does not under-
stand."
